Fibre deployment of next-generation high-speed broadband networks is considered to be a decisive development for any information-based society, yet investment activities and especially the adoption of fibre-based broadband services take place only very gradually in most countries. This work identifies the most important determinants of the adoption of fibre-based broadband services, using the most recent panel data from the European Union member states (EU27) for the years from 2004 to 2012.
Introduction
The traditional ("first-generation" copperor coax-based) broadband networks appear to be outdated and it has become necessary to speed up these networks in recent years to account for the growing demand for bandwidth/connection speed. According to "Nielsen's law", the broadband connection speed increases every year by 50% (FTTH Council Europe 2012, p. 12 ). Next-generation fibre-based access (NGA) networks deployed on the ground provide almost unlimited bandwidth capacity. As these networks represent a general purpose technology, they are expected to induce significant productivity improvements and growth across major economic sectors such as health, electricity and transport (e.g. Czernich et al. 2011) . However, substituting the traditional infrastructure with fibreoptic networks also involves massive investment volumes. 1 The demand in terms of adoption (penetration) and supply-side activities in terms of investment in fibre-based network infrastructure (coverage) vary significantly in an international comparison. Most European countries lag far behind the leading Asian fibre nations (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), but also behind the development in the US (Briglauer and Gugler 2012) . As regards NGA adoption within Europe, Northern and Eastern European economies are leading by a large margin with NGA household adoption levels between ~10% (Denmark and Latvia) and ~26% (Lithuania) at the end of 2011. Exceptional cases are Belgium and Luxembourg, where the focus on less expensive NGA deployment technologies has facilitated adoption levels of ~45% and ~85%, respectively. However, most of the other European countries still show NGA adoption levels (far) below 5%, including all the major Western and Southern European economies. 2 Europe's gap in NGA deployment was recognized by the European Commission (EC) and explicitly addressed in its "Digital Agenda", which specifies goals in terms of high-speed broadband coverage and penetration. 3 In achieving these goals, one of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging NGA infrastructure should be subjected to sector-specific ex ante access regulation. Formermostly state-ownedtelecommunications monopolists ("incumbents") argue that sector-specific ex ante regulation restricts their ability to generate future revenues. Accordingly, fibre roll-out could only, if at all, be achieved on the basis of the deregulation 1 The total investments in nationwide NGA deployment (coverage) depend inter alia on the network topology employed and the targeted coverage levels and amount to billions of euros (wik consult 2008). 2 See Figure A .1 in the Annex, which reports time-series plots for high-and low-cost NGA deployment scenarios for the EU27 countries. 3 The Digital Agenda "seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps" (European Commission 2010a, p. 19) . Whereas the target in (i) refers to a coverage level of 100%, the target in (ii) is related to a minimum household adoption level subject to quality characteristics that can be realized only with NGA technologies.
[2] of the relevant markets; at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations ("regulatory holidays") is deemed to be essential. Regulation of network access would, in turn, be detrimental to dynamic efficiency in terms of investment incentives and infrastructure innovation. Instead, it would be sufficient to rely on market mechanisms and infrastructure-based competition in particular.
Conversely, alternative operators that are dependent on access regulation ("service-based entrants") as well as some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) fear the rise of NGA networks as another upcoming monopolistic infrastructure, if regulation is released or removed entirely. They argue that incumbent firms or other alternative NGA infrastructure operators would gain an essential and longlasting competitive ("first-mover") advantage, which implies the need to have appropriate ex ante regulation in place. Regulatory-induced service-based competition would also have an immediate effect on static efficiency in terms of lower prices and hence on the adoption of (new) communications technologies on the demand side.
Based on an unbalanced panel of the EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2012, this paper addresses the following research questions: (i) What is the impact of broadband access regulations on NGA adoption? (ii) How does infrastructure-based competition stemming from wireless (mobile) networks influence the extent of NGA adoption? (iii) What is the role played by network effects that might lead to an endogenous adoption process? This paper represents the first European-based attempt to quantify the determinants of NGA adoption with the most recent country-level data. A multiplicity of methods and a broad set of control variables serve as important robustness checks. Furthermore, we argue that there is no endogeneity problem in terms of reverse causality in the empirical specification, which relates first-generation broadband demand-and supply-side factors to second-generation NGA markets and services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the recent and most relevant contributions in the empirical literature in section 2. Section 3 briefly provides the necessary background information on the technical context of NGA networks. Section 4 then describes basic hypotheses concerning the role of sector-specific regulation and competition as well as the other main cost and demand factors. Section 5 describes our data set. Section 6 presents the empirical specification and our identification strategy. Section 7 discusses the main empirical results. To conclude, section 8 summarizes and contains some final remarks.
Literature review
The empirical literature related to the impact of broadband access regulations and competition can be divided into three broad categories: (i) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on investment; (ii) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on adoption (penetration); and (iii) qualitative analysis with a focus on penetration or investment. The latter appears to be most meritorious in the case of too few observations in which quantitative analysis cannot provide reliable guidance. However, we think [3] that the availability of NGA-related data is sufficient now to allow robust statistical analysis. Accordingly, in this section we focus on quantitative studies only and do not review the literature related to qualitative studies. 4 When reviewing the quantitative literature, one has to be aware of the heavily interest-driven nature of the discussion and of the fact that a large number of contributions represent directly industry-sponsored work. This seems to be especially relevant to econometrics work due to its high sensitivity to the methodological specifications and "the opacity of its techniques to the vast majority of policy makers" (Berkman Center 2010, p. 96) . Therefore, our literature review also excludes industry-sponsored work that has not been published in peer-reviewed academic journals.
Regarding the impact of regulation on investment (i), Jung et al. (2008) , who use US data for the years from 1997 to 2002, find that infrastructure competition increases the investment incentives while mandatory access obligations at best have a weak effect on the investment of infrastructure operators.
Recent work with data from EU countries exhibits similar results: Grajek and Röller (2011) investigate the relationship between regulation and total investment in the telecommunications industry. Their study is among the few that explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of regulation and investment. Investment is quantified therein rather broadly by the tangible fixed assets of telecommunications operators and, thus, does not explicitly refer to broadband or NGA deployment. Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) are the first to estimate the effects of broadband access regulation on NGA deployment. They find that countries where broadband access regulation is more effective experience lower fibre deployment. However, they use data for the years from 2002 to 2007, which only cover the NGA roll-out in its very early stage and the authors do not capture the investment dynamics. Briglauer et al. (2013) investigate the determinants of NGA investment with a direct measure of real NGA investment for yearly data from 2005 to 2011. They find that stricter previous broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure from cable and mobile networks affects NGA deployment in a non-linear manner.
Regarding the literature on the impact of regulation on adoption (ii), there are several contributions related to broadband markets, but actually no NGA-related studies. Using US data from 2001 to 2004, Denni and Gruber (2007) find that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband diffusion in the longer term, whereas regulatory-induced service-based competition has a positive impact only if the number of service-based entrants is not too large. Non-US-based work mainly refers to OECD country-level data. Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of broadband penetration for the years from 2003 to 2008. They find that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband penetration, whereas service-based competition is an impediment to penetration. Lee et al. (2011) analyse the determinants of broadband diffusion for the years from 2000 to 2008. With respect to unbundling obligations, the authors find a positive and 4 A comprehensive overview of qualitative studies can be found in Berkman Center (2010, pp. 121-136) . Our review also excludes a number of recent quantitative studies in which the data are based on surveys (e.g. Sunada et al. 2011 ) and that do not consider inter alia the role of regulation and competition.
[4] significant effect on the speed of diffusion. They admit, however, that unbundling might have a negative impact on long-term investment and the broadband saturation level. Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) find that infrastructure-based competition has a significant and positive impact on broadband penetration, whereas unbundling has no significant effect for data from 2000 to 2002.
Finally, some contributions refer to data from European countries. Distaso et al. (2006) analyse EUrelated data from 2001 to 2004 and find that infrastructure-based competition is the main driver of broadband take-up and plays a more important role in penetration than service-based competition, especially in the longer term. Höffler (2007) examines data for sixteen Western European countries for the years from 2000 to 2004. He concludes that broadband deployment was predominantly triggered by infrastructure-based competition, with service-based competition playing a secondary role.
Summarizing, the majority of the empirical literature suggests that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on both investment and penetration. In turn, the evidence regarding servicebased competition relying on broadband access regulations tends to be negatively related to investment activities, while the impact on broadband adoption seems to be less clear. To the best of the author's knowledge, there is no empirical work that employs a direct measure of NGA adoption and examines the causal impact of regulation and competition. This paper intends to fill this gap.
Relevant NGA scenarios
Historically, first-generation legacy networks 5 deployed twisted copper-wire pairs to overcome the last mile ("local loop") to the subscriber in order to provide narrow bandwidth voice telephony services (POTS/ISDN) only. Many decades later, they were made capable of supporting broadband services by means of digital subscriber line (DSL) transmission technology. However, due to technical reasons, the bandwidth of DSL technologies is limited. In order to realize the NGA characteristic bandwidth, it is necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by placing the DSL transmission equipment closer to the retail customers' premises, e.g. in the cabinets that house distribution frames ("fibre to the cabinet" -FTTC). In the remaining copper-wire line of the last mile, the latest DSL transmission technology is used. This solution can provide bandwidths of 20 Mbit/s to 100 Mbit/s. In addition to upgrading first-generation copper-wire (DSL) networks in the local loop, the roll-out of high-speed communications networks might also be realized by upgrading cable (coax) television networks, which is referred to as "fibre to the last amplifer", which provides bandwidths up to 150 Mbit/s. Similar or even higher bandwidths (above 100/150 Mbit/s) can be achieved if optical fibre is extended to or into the building ("fibre to the building" -FTTB). Only the remaining wiring inside the building relies on conventional copper wires. If the optical line is directly connected to the individual 5 This term refers to networks already in existence and historically owned exclusively by incumbent operators.
[5] home ("fibre to the home" -FTTH), this would be the most future-proof technological solution, as it enables a large number of future services with nearly unlimited bandwidth (RTR 2010, pp. 189-191). 6 FTTx stands for a family of technologies that includes all the NGA scenarios described above. As such, it differs from a more narrow definition that refers to cost-intensive FTTH/B technologies only in the case that the fibre infrastructure terminates inside or no more than two metres away from the consumers' building, either the basement, the house or the apartment. 7
During the relevant analysis period (2004 to 2012), mobile broadband access has already been facilitated by 3G+ technologies such as GPRS, EDGE, UMTS and HSDPA. Moreover, the industry expects long-term evolution (LTE) to enable transmission rates similar to wireline NGA (FTTx) scenarios in the near future. Currently, however, LTE is still in the test phase and the aforementioned mobile broadband standards are far from achieving FTTx-specific bandwidth levels. Therefore, mobile broadband is not considered to be a relevant (second-generation) NGA technology in the empirical analysis.
Hypotheses
From the empirical literature, one can infer that there is a common understanding that both demandside and supply-side factors have an influence on the adoption of fibre-based broadband services.
Although the drivers of demand differ from the drivers of supply, most studies implicitly refer to a direct and positive relationship between investment (coverage) and adoption (penetration). Clearly, network coverage is a pre-condition for the successful adoption of NGA services and therefore the higher the available infrastructure stock, the higher the potential subscriber base (Wallsten and Hausladen 2009; Bouckaert et al. 2010). 8 This section identifies the determinants of NGA investment and adoption and sets out corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned with the underlying research questions. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 focus on regulation and competition as the main explanatory variables that directly impact on the supply side, i.e. NGA investment. Likewise, cost conditions will shift the supply curve but also exert an indirect impact on NGA adoption (section 4.3). Finally, the adoption process will be directly influenced by diverse demand-side factors and network effects (section 4.4).
However, the demand will also be related to regulation and competition, which affect prices and quality and thus indirectly the adoption of NGA services. 
Regulation
In EU member states, where asymmetric ex ante regulation is imposed on first-generation broadband markets, alternative operators can rent the local loop from the incumbent operator based on costoriented access charges ("unbundling") . This allows alternative operators to provide (first of all) broadband services. Service-based entrants may also offer retail broadband services by purchasing "bitstream" as a wholesale input from the incumbent operator but at a more service-based level of the value chain. Finally, "resale" means that access-seeking service providers receive and resell a wholesale input of the incumbent operator with virtually no scope for technological product differentiation (RTR 2010, pp. 176, 179) .
NGA regulations will be defined and imposed by NRAs only in future decisions or, if already implemented, the effectiveness of these decisions still remains to be seen (Cullen International 2011, Tables 4, 9 and 10) . It can be argued, however, that past regulation in first-generation broadband markets has clearly shaped the expectations for NGA regulations. This has been recently confirmed in NGA-relevant recommendations of the EC as well as in previous court decisions. 9 On the one hand, stricter wholesale access regulations increase service-based competition at the retail level in terms of lower broadband prices, exerting a positive impact on the demand side. 10 On the other hand, tight regulation of existing broadband access products most likely, as mentioned above, creates corresponding expectations about the future regulation of NGA access products that decrease the investment incentives of (potential) infrastructure operators for the following: (i) imposing costoriented access prices for bottleneck inputs typically reduces profits or precludes excess profits of the regulated firm, which results in asymmetric distribution of the expected profits and, therefore, in a lower net present value of investment projects (Valetti 2003) . Furthermore, access regulation typically ignores (ii) the opportunity costs of real options (Guthrie 2009) and the fact that (iii) risks were distributed asymmetrically among regulated incumbent and entrant operators. Therefore, (iv) regulation reduces not only the investment incentives of regulated infrastructure operators but also those of potential entrant infrastructure operators who benefit from a risk-free option due to mandatory access obligations asymmetrically imposed on the incumbent operator (Pindyck 2007) . Finally, pending decisions on NGA regulations have already led to substantial regulatory uncertainty, which constitutes another investment impediment. According to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) , who model the 9 The NGA recommendation of the European Commission (2010b) as well as former draft versions clearly indicate that the EC is very much determined to extend its cost-based regulatory approach to the emerging NGA communications infrastructure. The reader is also referred to the earlier decision of the German Government to exempt the incumbent operator (Deutsche Telekom AG) from wholesale access obligations to its new infrastructure (FTTC) network ("regulatory holidays"). The EC, however, took Germany to court over this legal provision in 2007, which finally decided against it in 2009 (C-424/07).
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Lower first-generation broadband prices do not necessarily imply higher levels of adoption of secondgeneration NGA services. Section 5.2.3 outlines the potential impact of broadband prices in more detail as well as our underlying assumptions.
[7] effects of different regulatory regimes on NGA investment, a regime of less intense access regulations or regulatory holidays would have the most positive effects on investment, whereas the current EU standard of strict cost-based access regulation turns out to be inferior. 11
Summarizing, we expect that ex ante sector-specific regulation in the form of mandatory access regimes has a negative impact on NGA investment and hence indirectly also on the adoption of NGA services. Higher levels of regulatory-induced service-based competition, however, might also have an opposite effect via lowering prices, which would increase demand and NGA adoption.
Competition
Telecommunications, by all means, have become one of the most dynamic and competitive industries since the beginning of the EU liberalization process in 1997/98. Likewise, recent and future investment in NGA is driven by infrastructure-based competition, most notably from mobile networks ("intermodal"), which "threaten" first-generation (copper and cable) networks and services. The socalled phenomenon of fixed-to-mobile substitution has already been quite intense with respect to narrowband voice telephony services at the beginning of NGA deployment (around 2005) and has become increasingly important until now, not only regarding voice telephony but also more and more to broadband services. 12 With respect to the potential impact of intermodal competition on NGA investment, one has to distinguish the following opposing effects (Aghion et al. 2005 ). On the one hand, competitive markets bear incentives for innovative investment in view of temporary market power rents that can be captured (the "escape competition effect"), leading to a positive relation between intermodal competition and NGA investment. Indeed, the deployment of NGA networks can be seen as the "last chance" for traditional wireline infrastructure operators to escape successfully from broadband competition stemming from mobile networks with innovative and high-bandwidth-demanding NGA services that cannot be realized by means of mobile broadband technologies in the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, intense intermodal competition in terms of pronounced fixed-to-mobile substitution will eventually reduce the potential rents and, thus, increasingly counteract NGA investment because 11 See also Briglauer and Gugler (2012) , who evaluate NGA deployment and adoption in different geographical areas (Asia, the EU and the US) in view of the underlying regulatory approaches with a particular focus on the investment incentives of the current EU regulatory framework. 12 According to the the EC's "Indicators on the electronic communications market", the average EU mobile broadband penetration of all users (PCs/laptops and handheld devices) is about 41%, whereas the EU average fixed broadband penetration is 27.7% (including basic and high-speed connections) as of January 2012. Regarding the number of subscribers, fixed-to-mobile substitution is even more pronounced: whereas the average EU number of mobile subscribers increased constantly up to 127% by the end of 2011, the average number of fixed-line connections has decreased significantly in recent years. All the data are available from the EC's Digital Agenda Scoreboard website: http://ec.europa.eu/digitalagenda/en/scoreboard.
[8] operators will no longer be able to appropriate the necessary profits from NGA investment (the "Schumpeterian" effect).
Finally, one has to consider the "replacement effect" (Arrow 1962) , according to which new NGA investment would "cannibalize" quasi-monopolistic profits from old first-generation infrastructure services, increasing the opportunity costs and thus reducing the incentive to invest. 13 The replacement effect appears to be of practical relevance, as most EU27 member states have well-established firstgeneration infrastructure in view of both network coverage and recent and foreseeable advances in DSL/cable technology standards. As a result, conventional broadband services enjoy broad consumer acceptance in most EU member states, which also establishes non-negligible switching costs on the consumers' side and hinders migration to the new technology unless its incremental benefits are large and transparent enough for consumers (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 241) .
In summary, we expect a non-linear relationship between NGA investment and the intensity of infrastructure-based (intermodal) competition from mobile networks. An increase in competitive intensity might havein the same manner as regulatory-induced service-based competitiona positive impact on the adoption of NGA services, i.e. on the demand side, as infrastructure-based competition enhances services 14 and reduces the average broadband price level. With respect to the replacement effect, we expect that a higher diffusion of first-generation broadband (intramodal) connections leads to a lower adoption rate of second-generation NGA services.
Cost factors
The civil engineering and construction costs related to digging represent by far the most relevant cost drivers for NGA deployment. As these cost factors are largely fixed and sunk costs, one can expect that the average deployment costs will decrease with the number of broadband/NGA subscribers ("economies of density"; wik consult 2008). Furthermore, these deployment costs will crucially depend on largely time-invariant topographic and demographic characteristics, such as urbanization, population or household density and housing structure; in particular, the number of multi-dwelling units is a major issue (FTTH Council Europe 2012, pp. 24-25).
Relevant institutional factors, such as regulations on capital costs, rights of way and digging or other allowances and technical standards, local availability and reusability of ducts and dark fibre or NGAspecific state aid policies, also show hardly any variation with respect to the relevant time frame of our analysis. 13 See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a more general description of the replacement effect in the communications industry. 14 Whereas the main merits of regulation and service-based competition refer to lower prices, including pricing innovations and customer care, infrastructure-based competition also has the technical potential to enhance services via quality innovation.
[9]
Demand factors
The demand depends on the average price for high-speed broadband services, the overall market size in terms of total communications expenditure and consumer wealth in general. Consumers with higher average communications expenditures can be regarded as having greater affinity with information and communications technologies (ICT), which might result in higher levels of NGA adoption (FTTH Council Europe 2012, p. 42). The demand for NGA services is also driven by a variety of consumer preferences, referring to the overall affinity with ICT, conventional Internet usage and usage intensity of high-speed broadband services. Consumers' needs are furthermore determined by their average education levels, since higher levels of education improve e-literacy skills, which considerably increases the utility derived from NGA technologies. Also, more highly educated people tend to be more prone to adopting and experimenting with new ICT (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, p. 302 ).
Finally, one has to consider network effects as a special type of externality underlying the NGA adoption process, in case the number of subscribers (and/or producers) has an impact on the consumers' utility (firms' profit) (Shy 2010) . In general, increases in the adoption rates also lead to increases in the usage intensity of the respective services (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 240) .
Consumers' utility can be related to the possibility of communicating with one another at the consumer level either directly, e.g. via different "Web 2.0" platforms, or indirectly, in the case of network effects occuring at different producer levels. For instance, the more users subscribe to (high-speed) Internet services, the more specific content and related applications will be programmed, which increases the consumers' utility and willingness to adopt such (NGA) services. The same is true for the development of related hardware and electronic equipment. Furthermore, it is likely that the NGA adoption process is subject to learning spillovers, inasmuch as the value added of NGA services appears to be a priori unknown to potential consumers, whose valuation inter alia depends on the information gathered by the already-existing subscriber base (Grajek 2010, p. 133) . Operators simply benefit from the network size, since an increase in the total number of subscribers lowers the average costs significantly in view of the NGA network topology and thus increases the profits. All the network effects described above give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process, which suggests that the contemporaneous and previous NGA adoption rates are positively related, leading to a virtuous circle: the higher the existing subscriber base, the higher the potential network benefits.
Data and variables
The empirical specification is based on the following data sources. The "EU Progress Report" provides yearly data for all the relevant wholesale broadband access regulations. Our second main source is the database of FTTH Council Europe, which includes the annual numbers of connected NGA lines for all the EU27 member states. EUROSTAT/COCOM provide data on the total population, [10] education, Internet usage and ICT labour costs as well as the housing structure. We use the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data to measure intermodal infrastructure competition and Quantum-Web tariff data as a representative measure of the average broadband price that is related to the first-generation infrastructure. Finally, data from the World Bank provide us with the GDP per capita, the European Intelligence Unit (EIU) with measures of labour and wage costs and the percentage of people living in urban areas and EUROMONITOR with telecommunications revenues and the number of households and Internet users.
As the data availability differs by variable, we use an unbalanced panel data set of EU27 countries for the time range from 2004 to 2011 for yearly data on our independent variables and from 2005 to 2012 for yearly data on our dependent variable. All the variable definitions and sources as well as summary statistics are listed in detail in the Annex in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable, FTTx_hh, measures adoption as the actual number of NGA connections divided by a country's total number of households. 15 In line with the description in section 3, the relevant NGA/FTTx technologies include FTTH/B/C and fibre to the last amplifier. The dependent variable thus represents the number of households exhibiting sufficient willingness to pay and actively using one of the FTTx-based (NGA) services under a commercial contract.
Independent variables
The independent variables can be divided into the following categories: (i) regulation, (ii) infrastructure-based competition, (iii) prices and (iv) cost and demand controls.
Regulation
The regulation variable, reg_bb, measures the lines actively used by service-based competitors as the share of the total regulated wholesale broadband lines (including unbundling, bitstream and resale) related to the total retail broadband lines. Therefore, this variable not only includes all the wholesale broadband access regulations as outlined in section 4.1, but also provides a direct measure of their effectiveness. 16
15
The other metric commonly refers to per capita terms. Both measures have their strengths and weaknesses.
Adoption in per capita terms refers to both business and residential users, whereas household penetration omits business customers. However, household subscription data seem to be the more correct measure as fixed-wireline (NGA) connections are typically related to a single household but not to an individual subscriber (as is the case for wireless subscriptions). Hence, we prefer household data, butas it will be shownour estimates are robust to the alternative specification in per capita terms. 16 As a consequence, we do not have to rely on broadly defined indices, dummy-based scorecards or other proxies, which are commonly used in the related literature but hardly related to fixed broadband wholesale access regulations (such as the OECD regulatory index for the telecoms sector). The "Polynomics [11] Furthermore, as outlined in section 4.1, it can be argued that the effectiveness of the regulation of the "old" network infrastructure, reg_bb, is exogenous with respect to the deployment of the "new" infrastructure. At the same time, previous regulation on broadband markets is a rather reasonableand in fact the bestproxy for expected NGA regulation, inasmuch as reg_bb represents the most relevant remedial measures within the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets.
Competition
The main form of infrastructure-based competition related to first-generation infrastructure services 
Prices
As outlined in sections 4.1 and 4.2, the net impact of regulation and competition on NGA adoption is undetermined, since regulatory-induced service-based competition influences prices and thus adoption on the demand side but it also negatively affects NGA investment on the supply side, which decreases NGA adoption. Likewise, a high level of infrastructure-based competition brings down broadband prices but, beyond a certain level, also deteriorates NGA investment. In order to isolate the direct supply-side effects of the competition and regulation variables, one has to account for the market outcome that is related to first-generation competition by controlling for the average broadband price level, price_bb. The net impact of the variable price_bb on NGA adoption is determined by the following effects: (i) in the case that first-and second-generation broadband services are substitutes, an increase in price_bb shifts demand and increases NGA adoption; (ii) to the extent that price_bb stands as a proxy for NGA prices, an increase in price_bb will decrease NGA adoption alongside the demand curve (own-price effect); (iii) if price_bb stands as a proxy for a general broadband price level Regulation Index 2012" (Zenhäusern et al. 2012 ) is the most related to the EU regulatory framework, but it is available only up to 2010 and captures only the formal aspects of regulation and not its effectiveness.
However, certain access regulations imposed by NRAs might exist on paper for years without any real effect on the relevant markets. In contrast, our measure incorporates the actual market effectiveness of ex ante regulations by linking these to the corresponding market outcomes (the same argument in favour of effectivity-based measures can be found in Bacache et al. 2012 or Briglauer et al. 2013 ). The Polynomics Regulatory Index 2012 is available for the years from 1997 to 2010 at: http://www.polynomics.ch/rdi.php.
[12] that reflects the supply determinants, such as the number of intramodal competitors and firstgeneration network topology or the extent of public broadband subsidies, a decrease in price_bb increases NGA adoption due to more favourable market conditions. Also, a lower broadband price level increases the customer base that might eventually be migrated to NGA services and hence increases NGA adoption. Since the definition and the quality characteristics of the broadband price variable, price_bb, are distinctively different from representative NGA services and as bb_lines_hh controls for the substitute infrastructure, we assume that the effects in (i) and (ii) are dominated by the effects in (iii) and thus expect a negative sign of price_bb.
Cost controls
We use the following measures for the demographic and topographic cost factors. Whereas urban_pop reflects different cost structures due to varying shares of rural and densely populated areas, hh_dens represents a country's average household size and therefore a measure of the housing structure. The yearly number of building permissions of multiple dwelling units, mdw, provides another measure of household structure.
We use the following measures for NGA construction costs: whereas lab_cost represents an annual labour cost index, lab_cost_ICT gives an annual labour cost index that is related to ICT industries and wage measures manufacturing costs per hour.
Demand controls
The total telecommunications revenues normalized to households, telco_rev_hh, act as a proxy for the ICT market size and, thus, for the overall willingness to pay for broadband/NGA services in a country.
GDP_pc_pp measures income effects. Furthermore, we include the variable iday, which provides the share of the population that uses the Internet frequently, and i_iugm, which provides the share of the population that uses bandwidth-intense Internet applications, to cover NGA-relevant consumer tastes.
The number of Internet users per capita, int_user_pc, represents another proxy for the overall ICT affinity within a country. The educational level, edu, is measured as the percentage of the adult population that has completed at least upper-secondary education.
Finally, network effects are considered by adding the lagged dependent variable, Fttx_hh (t-1) , as a righthand-side variable to the empirical specification. Fttx_hh (t-1) measures the installed subscriber base and thus the aggregate demand in the previous period.
6 Empirical specification
The model
As can be inferred from the literature review, some studies focus on broadband penetration, i.e. demand, while others focus on investment, i.e., the supply of broadband/NGA connections. Only a few [13] empirical studies explicitly identify broadband/NGA supply and/or demand or outline the underlying reduced-form approach. Our baseline specification refers to a reduced-form model in which demand is expressed in terms of NGA household adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hh). Imposing the equilibrium condition (demand = supply) eliminates the endogenous NGA-related price variable and yields the following econometric reduced-form specification: 17
(1) (1) depends on the main variables of interest, i.e., regulation and competition, in state i in year t, as well as on a vector of demand and cost controls (Z i(t-1) ). Note that Z i(t-1) also contains a measure of the average broadband price level, price_bb, which explicitly controls for the competitive outcome in first-generation broadband markets, allowing the estimation of the direct supply-side effect of regulation and competition. The additive error term ε it is assumed to be i.i.d and θ i represents country-specific effects. Equation (1) includes lagged values of all the exogenous variables. Assuming that adoption decisions at a particular point in time do not depend on contemporaneous but on the last period's conditions makes sense as consumers' adoption process will typically be related to switching costs, which might become reinforced in the case when long-term retail broadband contracts exist. 18 Any adoption process is inherently dynamic and thus it is crucial to separate out adequately the technological diffusion effects from the explanatory variables. The vast majority of the related empirical literature finds that (ICT) adoption processes are best described through S-shaped (logistic or Gompertz) functional curves that represent different versions of an exponential growth model, which ultimately converges to a certain saturation level. 19 However, even in fibre-leading European countries, the NGA adoption processes are still in their early phase and far from being close to the respective inflection points. 20 Therefore, NGA adoption can be approximated by a simpler exponential 17 For a similar approach see Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006, pp. 450-451) . The authors, however, do not eliminate the endogenous price variable but pool the whole set of available demand and supply variables in their specification of broadband penetration. 18 Also, with an insufficient number of observations one would run the risk of overfitting the data. The lagged specification in equation (1) allows the full employment of the available panel data set. 19 For recent and ICT-related diffusion studies see e.g. Grajek and Kretschmer (2009), Czernich et al. (2011) or Lee et al. (2011) . 20 For recent evidence see Briglauer and Gugler (2012) or Samanta et al. (2012) . In particular, note that one can infer from Figure A. 1 that almost all the EU27 states are far from the adoption target defined in the EC's Digital Agenda ("50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps").
[14] growth model in equation (1), which relates NGA adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hh it ), to a linear time trend, t. 21
Equation (2) represents a dynamic extension of the baseline specification in equation (1) in which the lagged dependent variable, ln (FTTx_hh i(t-1) ), is included as a right-hand side variable (instead of the linear time trend, t). The coefficient α 1 measures the importance of network effects that give rise to an endogenous adoption process if 0 < α 1 < 1. (1 -α 1 ) measures the constant "speed of diffusion", λ, which comes from a Gompertz model of adoption (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, pp. 299-300) . λ is expressed as the percentage of the gap between the long-run (desired or target) stock of NGA subscribers and the subscribers in the previous period that is closed each period (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002; Andres et al. 2010; Grajek and Röller 2012) . 22 Again, the additive error term µ it is assumed to be i.i.d:
Estimating the reduced form in equations (1) and (2) enables comparative static analysis, which appears to be of prime importance for policy makers and in view of our policy-oriented research questions. 23
Identification
The desire to measure causation and to avoid endogeneity in spite of the reliance on non-experimental data is the key concern in empirical economics (Wooldridge 2002, p. 421; Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 715) . We argue, first of all, that the main source of endogeneity in the form of reverse causality is effectively eliminated by the reduced-form approach in equations (1) and (2): as we assess the impact of demand-and supply-side determinants related to first-generation broadband markets on secondgeneration NGA markets, we can hardly imagine that the current NGA adoption influences, for instance, the previous regulation on broadband markets that was implemented by NRAs typically many years ago. Accordingly, reverse causality that might otherwise lead to endogeneity should represent no problem. Second, by lagging the explanatory variables, NGA adoption is related to predetermined values of the independent variables. In order to reinforce these arguments, we also 21 Also, a log transformation helps to stabilize the series of our dependent variable. This represents a positive side effect in view of potential non-stationarity problems that cannot be tested formally given that our panel data set is unbalanced and neither the number of time periods (T ≤ 8) nor the number of cross-sectional units (n ≤ 27) tends to infinity (the "Im-Pesaran-Shin" unit-root test is designed for unbalanced panels but requires at least 10 observations per panel). 22 Let Fttx_hh it * denote the desired long-run stock of NGA subscribers; then, the Gompertz model of diffusion For the sake of clarity, we drop the cross-sectional index in the remainder of the paper.
[15] perform standard Granger causality tests. Third, we control for potential endogeneity due to unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity by including fixed effects (θ i ) at the country level. Table 1 shows the main results using fixed-effects ("FE") regressions to estimate our baseline specification (equation (1)). Regression (1) reports the FE estimates for the model specification that contains all the demand and cost controls ("Full"). The F-test (F_θ) following regression (1) shows that country-level FEs are significant, implying that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates if the FEs are correlated with the independent variables. Regression (1) reports t-statistics assuming that the errors in equation (1) are i.i.d., which might induce misleading inference as well (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 711-712) . Therefore, one has to control for both serial correlation and any arbitrary form of heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors. For short panels (T ≤ 8 in our case), this strategy is preferred to modelling a specific error correlation structure (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 725) . Regression (2) contains FE estimates for the full model based on robust standard errors ("rob"). Note, however, that robust standard errors still assume that there is no contemporaneous correlation across the panel units. Typically, spatial dependence is unlikely to exist at the country level with short time series. However, Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence does not provide unambiguous evidence (the statistic is -1.721 with a p-value of 0.0852 for regression
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(3)). Regression (5) therefore reports the "Driscoll-Kraay" standard errors ("DK"), which are assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the panels (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Hoechle 2007) .
In regressions (3) to (5), we eliminate all except the significant demand controls (int_user_pc (t-1) , edu (t-1) ) and the least insignificant cost controls (wage (t-1) , urban (t-1) ). 25 As it can be seen, the basic structure of the coefficients for the main variables remains effectively unchanged throughout regressions (1) to (5), which reassures us that those estimates are largely robust to alternative selections of control variables. The demand controls int_user_pc (t-1) and edu (t-1) are statistically significant with the expected signs in all the regressions in Table 1 and appear to capture ICT affinity and e-literacy best, respectively, as essential preconditions for the usage of high-speed broadband services.
Not only are the cost controls wage (t-1) and urban (t-1) insignificant but also the variable urban (t-1) has an unexpected sign in regressions (1) and (2). Whereas insignificant cost estimates appear to be primarily due to country FEs (low within variation), the unexpected sign of urban (t-1) might be attributed to two opposing effects. First, in densely populated areas, NGA deployment can serve more customers at the same time, thus reducing the costs for a single fibre connection (economies of density). Second, 24 STATA 12.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 25 Whereas urban (t-1) stands for demographic cost factors, wage (t-1) stands for construction costs. wage (t-1) is preferred to labcost_ict (t-1) , since only the former has the expected (meaningful) sign.
[16] however, the total digging costs are much higher in urban areas, where construction activities become more labour-intensive. We therefore include the interaction term urban*wage (t-1) in regressions (3) to (5) to capture this relationship. Indeed, urban (t-1) then shows the expected sign and its impact on NGA adoption decreases with increases in the wage level, wage (t-1) , in regressions (3) to (5).
With respect to period effects, we find that the linear time trend, t, is significant in regressions (3) Table 1 ) and hence their inclusion would result in less efficient estimates.
Overall, we refer to regressions (3) to (5) as final regressions ("Final") as these are the most efficient specifications. When comparing regression (3) with regression (5), one finds that imposing "Driscoll-Kraay" standard errors substantially increases the significance levels. However, as the estimator is based on an asymptotic theory, we have to consider the results with caution in view of our short panel.
( (6) the estimation results of model "Final_FE_rob", which we consider to be our most appropriate specification (= regression (3) in Table 1) . Regression (7) shows that the coefficient estimates remain virtually unchanged if we normalize our dependent variable with respect to the total population ("pop") instead of the total number of households. The first difference ("FD") specification in regression (8) also eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity but entails a substantial loss of efficiency. FD still shows similar estimates except for the coefficient of our regulation variable, reg_bb (t-1) , which has the expected sign but is less well identified. Regression (9) reports the results of the random-effects (RE) specification. Although the RE coefficients show a similar structure and a similar coefficient estimate for the variable reg_bb (t-1) , the FE specifications are clearly preferable in view of our observational data set. 26 Finally, regression (10) contains the estimation results of the specification that includes the lagged dependent variable, ln (Fttx_hh (t-1) ), as an additional regressor (equation (2)). Estimating regression (10) by means of an ordinary FE (within or LSDV) estimator would yield inconsistent and biased results, since the lagged dependent variable and the error terms would be correlated (Nickell 1981) . 26 Conceptually, our analysis focuses on the EU27 member states, which represent a particular set of rather homogenous countries and cannot be considered as a random sample drawn from the population of all countries. Empirically, a heteroskedastic-and cluster-robust Hausman test strongly rejects the RE model (in regression (6), the Sargan-Hansen test statistic is 71.025, not reported in Table 2 ), on the grounds that the RE estimates will be inconsistent.
[17] Bruno (2005a,b ) developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator ("LSDVC") for unbalanced panel data. 27 Again, the structure of the LSDVC estimation results in regression (10) is similar to that of the previous regressions and most coefficients of the main variables of interest are significant with the expected signs.
Apparently, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ln (Fttx_hh (t-1) ), is highly significant and substantial (α 1 = 0.7056) in regression (10), which informs us about the relevance of the network effects underlying the adoption of NGA services. A 10% increase in the number of NGA connections per household in the previous period leads to an increase of about 7.1% in the number of current NGA connections. Although a high value of α 1 might be due either to true state dependency or to correlation with unobserved heterogeneity (θ i ), a causal mechanism via the last period is likely because of the high potential of network effects for the adoption of new ICT services, as outlined in section 4.4. The speed of diffusion (λ = 1 -0.7056) suggests that it will take around 6.5 years to close 90% of the gap between the average number of NGA connections per household (0.05147) and the Digital Agenda's target value (0.5). Also, note that λ is significantly greater than zero, which confirms that migration to NGA services is subject to some non-negligible switching costs on the side of the consumers. 28
Regarding the main variables of interest, one first finds a significant and non-linear relationship with respect to our infrastructure-based competition variable, fms (t-1) and fms 2 (t-1) , for all the FE regressions (including LSDVC). The maximum of the non-linear relationship informs us about the optimal competitive market conditions for NGA adoption. For instance, one can infer from the corresponding coefficient estimate in regression (3) in Table 1 ( = regression (6) in Table 2 ) that a share of ~19.5% of fixed landlines is optimal. The grand mean of fms (t-1) is ~26.88% and thus above this optimal value, which means that the escape competition effect still dominates the Schumpeterian effect and fixed-tomobile substitution has exerted a positive impact on NGA adoption in the past. However, increasing competition from mobile networks brought the average value of this variable close to its optimum during the analysis period with A weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties only hold for a large number of cross-sectional units (n ≤ 27 in our case). Monte Carlo evidence supports the LSDVC estimator, which proves to be (much) more efficient than various instrumental variable-type estimators when n is small (Kiviet 1995) . However, LSDVC is not applicable in the presence of endogenous regressors (Bruno 2005b) . In view of the arguments in section 6.2, we are confident that there is no endogeneity problem as we control for unobserved heterogeneity; reverse causality also appears to be unlikely with respect to our empirical specification. To prove the latter, we also perform standard Granger causality tests (Granger 1969) . The results, which are reported in Table A .3 in the Appendix, indicate that there is no bidirectional causality. 28 A recent survey of the European Commission (2012, p. 60) shows that a majority of EU citizens are not willing to switch to high-speed broadband services due to (i) lack of awareness of potential benefits, (ii) lack of experience with new services and (iii) expected price level of NGA services. 29 It is interesting to contrast this result with the corresponding finding of Briglauer et al. (2013) , who measure mobile competition in a different way (based on survey data for the years from 2005 to 2010) but also find [18] The coefficient of the variable bb_lines_hh (t-1) is significantly negative in all the FE regressions (excluding LSDVC), from which we infer that there is a substantial replacement effect with reference to the first-generation broadband infrastructure. As the latter includes both DSL and cable connections, we also test whether there is a differential effect with respect to these forms of intramodal competition by including an additional interaction term, bb_lines*cable (t-1) , in regression (4) in Table 1 . As the corresponding coefficient is insignificant (as well as the coefficient of the main effect, cable (t-1) ), we conclude that there is no differential impact and the replacement effect comes equally from both types of fixed broadband infrastructure. This result appears to be reasonable in view of the rather similar quality and price characteristics of intramodal coax and copper/DSL broadband retail services.
Finally, we find a coefficient of the regulatory variable, reg_bb (t-1) , which is estimated in the quite narrow range of -2.3210 to -2.3608 for the final FE regressions and significantly negative throughout all the estimations (except for the FD specification). This strongly supports our hypothesis outlined in section 4.1 that more intense regulation has a negative impact on the adoption of NGA services once we control for the price effect. The average estimate of the coefficient of reg_bb (t-1) (~ -2.35) implies that an increase in regulatory intensity of 10 percentage points leads to a decrease in NGA adoption of 20.95% ([=exp(-2.35*0.1)-1]*100). Evaluated at the grand mean, which represents the average EU27 member state, this implies an average decrease from 0.05147 to ~0.0407 NGA lines per household.
The average broadband price variable, price_bb (t-1) , is only marginally significant (except for the LSDVC specification in which the respective coefficient is highly significant). As it has a negative sign throughout, we infer that the price variable mainly stands proxy for a general broadband price level as presumed. Indeed, if we drop price_bb (t-1) from the regressions, the coefficient of reg_bb (t-1) increases throughout in absolute terms (e.g., from ~-2.352 to ~-2.435 in regression (3)), which shows that the price effect is opposed to the negative effect of regulation on NGA investment. However, since this increase is not significant, we infer that the negative direct impact of regulation on supply-side investment activities dominates the price effect on the demand side.
( 
Summary and final remarks
This work identifies the effects of sector-specific ex ante regulation and infrastructure competition on the adoption of NGA services in Europe using a recent panel data set of EU27 countries. As opposed to the related literature, the econometric specification explicitly addresses the endogeneity problem mainly by relating NGA adoption to regulation and competition in preceding broadband markets. that competition stemming from mobile networks has increased but is well below its optimum value on average.
[19]
The results indicate firstly that NGA adoption is negatively influenced by the extent and effectiveness of the wholesale broadband access regulation that is imposed on the incumbent's first-generation DSL infrastructure. Also, it should be pointed out that the impact of regulation is quite substantial. Accordingly, the goals of the EC's Digital Agenda seem to be at odds with the sector-specific EU regulatory framework, which intends to expand strict cost-based access regulation to the emerging NGA infrastructure and corresponding NGA wholesale access services. Realizing the targets of the EC to reach 50% adoption with 100 Mbit/s high-speed Internet connections by 2020 becomes much more unlikely if the prime importance is attached to high-cost FTTH/B deployment scenarios (Briglauer and Gugler 2012) . Secondly, competition stemming from mobile networks affects NGA adoption in a nonlinear way, as expected. With respect to the time frame of our analysis, the positive impact of the escape competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect. Thirdly, we also found evidence of a significant replacement effect underlying the first-generation broadband infrastructure, which might become even more reinforced in the future in view of the potential of new DSL and coax technologies.
Finally, our dynamic specification suggests that substantial network effects give rise to an endogenous NGA adoption process. As this process exhibits high growth potential, the adoption target of the EC appears to be still feasible timewise, if one refers to a broad NGA definition and if NGA adoption is not endangered by shocks on the demand or supply side or, most notably, by wrong policy incentives.
It should be noted once again that the intention of the paper is neither to identify the demand or supply related to NGA adoption and deployment, respectively, nor to analyse the dynamics of the involved adjustment processes; instead, the paper focuses on the marginal effects of the main policy variables of interest by means of comparative static analysis. In view of the dynamic interaction of supply and demand, a proverbial chicken-and-egg situation gives rise to a coordination problem: it is not clear a priori whether there has to be demand for new, attractive and bandwidth-hungry services in advance in order to enforce the deployment of new communications infrastructure or whether those services and applications will automatically evolve after the necessary infrastructure has been put in place. Internet history indicates that the development of content and applications usually follows infrastructure deployment, e.g. there would be none of the Web 2.0 services and social platforms available in a world with narrowband dial-up Internet infrastructure. This view suggests that the goals of the EC's Digital Agenda can be reached best if NGA deployment is primarily driven by the supply side, either by means of deregulatory approaches or via optimal competitive market conditions, as indicated by our results and the vast majority of the broadband-related literature.
[20] Regressions (1) to (5) include country-specific fixed effects (FE), which are not reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (2) to (5). Indeed, a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation indicates that there is first-order autocorrelation in the data. Likewise, a Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a constant variance. Regression (5) employs "Driscoll-Kraay" standard errors ("DK"), whereby the autocorrelation structure has a lag length of m(T)=floor[4(T/100)^(2/9)], which turned out to be robust to alternative lag specifications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. As data for Luxembourg is available only for 2009 onwards and due to its exceptionally high FTTx adoption level, Luxemborug is not included in Figure A. 1.
[24] * Since Granger causality tests require the inclusion of lagged dependent variables, we had to use the LSDVC specification (regression (10) in Table 2 ). In order to test for reverse causality, all the variables with significant coefficients in regression (10) are considered. LSDVC calculates a bias-corrected LSDV estimator in which the dependent variable is lagged once on the left-hand side. Therefore, we include only one lag of the respective dependent variable in regressions (A.1) to (A.4). In regression (A.1), causation is established, since our main regulatory and competition variables are jointly significant in line with our baseline specification. The lower part of Table A .3 shows the p-values for the Granger χ2 test once for the inclusion of one lag and once for the inclusion of two lags of the independent variables (the corresponding coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the latter case are not reported in Table A .3). For regressions (A.2) to (A.4), the Granger causality χ2 statistics are highly insignificant, suggesting that there is, as expected, no reverse causality.
The LSDVC standard errors in regression (A.1) to (A.4) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
